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Document No. 008

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Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 01/02/78 By: 008

STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: Concept of an Advanced Officer Training Program for DD/P

I. PROBLEM

To determine the advantages and disadvantages of DD/P's initiating a formalized, mid-career officer training program extending over ^{five} ~~two~~ to eight months as opposed to the current practice of assigning individuals to specific courses for two to five weeks at a time and recommend actions to support the findings of this study.

II. CONCLUSIONS

1. Initiation of such a training program can lead to improvements in officer performance within DD/P and opportunities for greater flexibility of reassignment of officer personnel to priority programs.

2. The time ^{five} ~~two~~ ^{will be} spent away from the officer's substantive job is offset by the advantages the Clandestine Services may obtain from such training. Advantages and disadvantages of this proposal are presented in the discussion which follows.

3. Such a program can be started ~~in October 1964~~ with as few as thirty students, gradually increasing to an annual class enrollment of

90 students, beginning in 1965. The proposed program

is not limited to 90 students. This training can be made available to all CSI officers whose projected job assignments require such comprehensive instruction.

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4. Without additional costs to the Agency, at this time, a formalized officer training program can immediately introduce economies, efficiencies, and improvements in the present mid-career training activities of CIA.

III. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

1. Approval by the DD/P to include instructing his staff and division chiefs (through appropriate career boards) to assign, not to exceed forty former JOT's (or other officers) with five or more years CIA service to the first running of the proposed Phase II Officer Training Program to begin in _____, 196__*, and thereafter assign ex-JOT's (and other qualified officers) to the program on an annual basis as soon as practicable after the completion of their fifth year of service.

2. If action "1" is approved and a definite date and a minimum of thirty students designated to attend the DD/P Officer Training Program, OTR immediately initiate detailed planning and scheduling of course content and classes to be submitted to the DD/P for concurrence.

3. If action "1" is approved, OTR prepare a tentative "Phase III" Senior Officer Training Program for approval by the DD/P.

4. Concurrence in the program by the Director of Personnel and the Inspector General.

not necessary

*Date to be selected by DD/P no earlier than 3 October 1960.

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4. See discussion for details and justification of conclusions
and recommended actions.

APPROVED

Director of Training

Initiating Officer:

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PPS/OTR

Approval or Disapproval:

DD/P

date

~~Concurrences or Non-Concurrences:~~

~~_____
Director of Personnel~~

~~_____
date~~

~~_____
Inspector General~~

~~_____
date~~

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IV. DISCUSSION

1. This study is based on an exchange of memorandums and conversations between top management DD/P officers and OTR dating as far back as August 1958. ~~To a lesser degree similar discussions~~ have been held with DD/I, DD/S, and IG representatives. There is a volume of opinion within CIA, concurred in by DTR, that the Agency needs a more formalized "in service" training program for experienced ~~DD/P officers~~. All agree such training should be based on those advanced, unique and complex clandestine services skills and techniques that can securely be presented only within the privacy of the Agency. Differences of opinion do exist as to the precise course content, who should attend the required training, and how long it should be. These details can be determined after further discussion with interested officials and approval of this concept by the Deputy Director, Plans.

*this gives
idea that
DDP matters
have been
discussed
outside
DDP/OTR*

2. This paper is intended to serve the DD/P and the DTR as background and a planning guide leading to an advanced (mid-career) training program for DD/P officers. It is suggested we build on the present 30-week JOT Program two subsequent training phases to be offered on an annual basis, a mid-career course for officers in the GS-11 to GS-13 career bracket and a Senior Program for officers at the GS-14/15 level.

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A considerable amount of such training is already being conducted in and external to the Agency. Where appropriate, OTR would like to program its existing courses so as to assure CIA officers of an "in service" training program more closely approximating that followed by their contemporaries of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and other components of the Government. Although this three-phase training approach has the secondary merit of being a career incentive device, its primary purpose is to eventually program training into predetermined (yet flexible) patterns that will produce a better trained and more versatile DD/P officer. ~~By so doing we will enhance CIA's efficiency and be able to better meet the intelligence, security, and covert action requirements of our nation.~~

3. Oversimplified, the concept of a three-phase training program looks like this. All grades, lengths of service and ages are suggestions and may be changed as desired by the DD/P.

DD/P OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM

PHASE I

JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING

Objective:	to qualify trainees to be Junior Officers
GS Rating:	GS-7 to GS-9
Average Age:	27 years

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PHASE II

CIA OFFICER TRAINING

Objective: to help produce a well rounded professional intelligence officer with the "know how" and technical skill and ability to apply mature, informed discrimination to his daily job activities and decisions for the remainder of his career.

Approximate GS Rating: GS-11 to GS-13

Average Age: 32 years

Approximate length of service in CIA: 6 years

PHASE III

DD/P SENIOR OFFICER TRAINING

Objective: to qualify selected officers to be eligible for senior positions in the Agency

Approximate GS Rating: GS-14 to GS-15

Average Age: 40 years

Approximate Length of Service in CIA: 14 to 16 years

4. In starting let us briefly review the present status of the JOT Program. It has now become the principal source of recruitment of trainees destined to become CIA officer generalists. We are presently recruiting about 125 JOT's per year; 90 for the Clandestine Services; 25 for DD/I; and 10 for DD/S. This ratio of ingress into the three principal offices of the Agency means that OTR's principal customer

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for future ~~mid-career~~ training will be the Clandestine Services. One reason for breaking our Career Training Program into Junior Officer Training, Officer Training, and Senior Officer Training phases stems from the rotation problem within DD/P. OTR as a support service adjusts its training programs to the job requirements and rotational plans of the operating components of the Agency. Generally speaking the average, now approximately 27 year old, JOT reporting to DD/P will go overseas and probably return to Headquarters after a single three-year or double two-year overseas tour. This would mean that beginning about 1965 there will be a regular flow of more or less 90 thoroughly tried and tested ex-JOT's returning to Headquarters. At this point the young officer is probably a GS-11 or a GS-12. Is this the point in their careers where they could be best spared from their DD/P jobs for as long as ^{five} ~~six~~ to eight months to receive additional operational, executive, and staff training?

5. We are featuring the JOT's as the principal future source of because for the moment they are our only predictable future our proposed student body ^{made} ~~although~~ the program could be available as desired by the Deputy Directors to all officers whose potential and projected job assignments require such instruction. Let us assume that this advanced training will take place through the fifth to seventh year of the young officer's service. If not done at this time it is likely

source of advanced Officer trainees.

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many of these officers will be off to another, three to four year, tour overseas where they will need the complete operational, administrative, executive and staff skills that will be presented in this advanced program and will receive their future training on a "when and if" he is available basis. With 411 trained JOT's or former JOT's now on board it will not be necessary for the Agency to wait until 1965 to implement this program. It may be initiated in the fall of 1960 if so desired and properly supported.

6. Remember the average age of the members of the present JOT class is 27 years. In 1965 the average age will be 32 and the officer will have about 25 years of remaining service before being eligible for thirty-year retirement. This is too early in his career for training for the highest positions of responsibility in the Agency. Neither he nor the Agency would truly profit from such training at that time. This means his senior training should come later. Again, adjusting to DD/P rotation cycles, it would appear that the Senior Training Program might take place at the end of about two additional double tours overseas and/or at Headquarters. This will involve approximately eight more years of the officer's career. At this point the JOT's of the present class will have the average age of 40 years. If they receive training in their fifteenth year of service, the Agency could anticipate a minimum

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of 15 years return from that schooling. For planning purposes let's accept as our goal the Senior Training of our officers during their fourteenth to sixteenth year of service. The JOT Program began in 1951. Following the above reasoning a full-fledged Senior Officer Training Program could be underway by 1965.

7. This paper intends to confine itself to the advanced or mid-career officer training program which we believe should be initiated as soon as practicable. It is necessary the reader appreciate that this is the mid-point of what, if approved, will become a three-phase CIA "in service" career officer training program. (We will build on and ~~not unnecessarily repeat the training foundation established in the JOT Program and omit that subject matter that may more profitably be included in the senior phase of the program.~~) No effort need be made to outline the length or course content of the Phase III senior officer training program until this concept is approved in principle. ~~It is believed this can more efficiently and more timely be done after having initiated and tested the proposed Phase II officer training program.~~ (The mid-career training presented in this paper stresses technical, operational, and executive competence up to and including the GS-14/15 levels.) The Phase III senior officer program would ~~of necessity~~ confine itself to preparing selected officers to be better qualified for possible assignment to the more responsible super-grade managerial positions in the

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Central Intelligence Agency and the national intelligence community.

Let's illustrate the type of training that might be included in a senior program by asking a few related questions. For example, how many of our GS-15's could answer the question if the DD/P called them in on Sunday morning and gave them a twenty-minute briefing on the situation in the Caribbean area today and then asked, "What should be our general line of action?" How many would start answering the question right then off the cuff, using oratory, plausible argument, glittering generality? How many would answer, "Give me a few hours," and then in a few hours return to the Deputy Director's office with a short, emphatic, well reasoned answer that they sincerely believed in and that Mr. Bissell would listen to and say, "I agree with you," and then tell the officer to put this plan of action into execution. This is equivalent to what happened to Dwight D. Eisenhower on Sunday, December 14, 1941 in General Marshall's office. He was then a temporary Brigadier General equivalent in rank to our GS-16. A few months earlier he had been promoted from the permanent rank of Lieutenant Colonel, equivalent to our GS-14. With world conditions as they are today, will CIA have men in depth who can do this sort of thing for any contingency that ~~might pop up anyplace in the world?~~ If the Phase II officer training concept is approved, OTR will initiate planning and programing of the Phase III senior curriculum.

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8. The basic content of our proposed Phase II CIA Officer Training

Program may be developed by taking existing, ~~time-tested~~, OTR courses *eliminating unnecessary duplication* and arranging them end to end over approximately ~~an~~ ^{seven} ~~eight~~-months *Phase II Training* period. The objective of ~~this~~ program will be to train well-rounded, all-purpose intelligence and covert action officers capable of doing or giving knowledgeable supervision to any of the CIA line or staff activities carried on at Headquarters or in the field up to and including GS-14/15 responsibilities. Tentatively such a program ~~would~~ ^{might} include the blocks of instruction and courses within those blocks shown in Table A (Phase II CIA Officer Training: DD/P Curriculum). With the exception of the last two courses listed, these are current OTR courses, the emphasis in which might be modified by the comments shown in parentheses after the course titles.

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TABLE A

PHASE II, CIA OFFICER TRAINING


SUGGESTED DD/P CURRICULUM

Approximate course
times, to be adjusted
as desired by DD/P

I. GENERAL BLOCK (Reorientation and redirection appropriate to
projected grade levels of the student body.)

- a. Clandestine Services Review 2 weeks
- b. Management and Operations Programing (Emphasizing
on-the-job training, fitness reports and persuasion of
subordinates and budgetary, financial, administra-
tive and support programing responsibilities.) 2 weeks
- c. Overseas Effectiveness Seminar (Emphasizing the
use of behavioral science skills in solving the
unique overseas problems of the Agency.) 1 week

d.




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2. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BLOCK

- a. Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements
(Emphasizing mechanical rapid reporting and cables.) 1 week
- b. Clandestine Scientific and Technical Operations
(Including ELINT and COMINT orientation.)

Sub-total



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* Foreign Liaison might be included w/in the F.I., CI and
CA Blocks reducing this to coordination of
activities w/in U.S. Govt.

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9. Flexibility can be built into the new program. Selected students enrolled in the program who do not require a particular course because of previous on-the-job experience or training may be assigned to intensive language and/or area training studies appropriate to their future job assignments. Officers who, because of their experience, do not need the entire program can be added to the regular student body for selected blocks of instruction or particular courses in accordance with the needs of the individual. Current ^{CAM} ~~will~~ courses ~~will~~ be continued as required. After programmed Phase II training has been going on for a number of years it could reduce to the point of disappearance the piecemeal offerings of these courses as they are now given. At the same time OTR would retain its capacity for tutorial instruction in these subjects. Existing courses now offered on a biannual or quarterly or more frequent basis will be continued as required. Where need be, to effect more efficient usage of instructor personnel, one or more of the existing course offerings will be absorbed into the suggested program; ~~the~~ the present counterintelligence course is offered seven times a year. About 15 students attend each presentation. Presented once for say thirty students attending the comprehensive program the total presentations could be reduced to six. In the three weeks saved in this manner the instructors could improve and prepare new material for

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the course. The suggested class program, instructional blocks, and course content ~~that follow~~ will continually be revised to keep abreast of changing world conditions. The over-all emphasis will be placed on training the case officer of the future; i.e., the case officer of the future must have at his disposal an entire series of technical gadgets and know how to use those gadgets with or without the support of technical personnel. Such devices are rarely an end in themselves. Normally they are introduced as an aid or supplement to existing operational techniques and procedures. Where a detailed technical skill is required it will be presented on a tutorial basis or included in the over-all program presented in Table A, if and when the demand from the operating components becomes sufficiently generalized to justify the latter approach.

10. The real problem confronting CIA in implementing this suggestion is that of the need for the assurance of the availability of the necessary student body on an annual basis. This assurance must come from the ~~DD/P~~ ^{Programming}. From the ~~latter's~~ ^{DDPS} viewpoint, we have identified the following disadvantages of programmed training:

- a. Loss of the services of the individual for the duration of the training program. This stems from the natural differences and conflicts between our short-term day to day interests and

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our larger long-term interests. Comprehensive training would be a reasonable attempt to help us meet the latter responsibilities.

initially
b. Program costs: No additional costs will be incurred by the introduction of programed Phase II officer training which can be accomplished with present personnel and facilities. ~~Eventually~~ it might be necessary to provide additional office space for the students, particularly for the outside reading of classified material. Currently they use the classrooms when classes are not in session or their own offices for this purpose. The latter solution ~~would~~ *might* not be feasible in a program lasting as long as six months or more.

25X1A

The Phase III senior officer program probably would involve some additional expense in the way of guest lecturers, etc.

Eventually there might be a requirement
c. Problems of favoritism and difficulties of selection

of trainees unless all officers attend within a specified general span of years. This may require more lead time in programing the careers of our officers, but that might be good for the long-range interests of the Agency.

d. Problems of reassignment on completion of training.

Unlike the JOT's, whose initial placement involves considerable assessment, time, and effort, it is assumed most officers would return to their parent career service (or division)

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Insert

clandestine ^{vulnerable} ^{with out} creating ~~undesirable~~ patterns of action this can be done as follows. Students can participate in seminars, problems and exercises involving the application of C.S. doctrine and principals of operations and management until appropriate & desirable courses of action become automatic through practice. The time allotted to most of the present ~~mid career~~ courses does not permit student participation to this extent.

Advanced

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and that the latter would have a fair idea of where they could best reassign the officer.

e. Difficulties of evaluating the benefits of the training.

OTR fully appreciates its contribution can only supplement on-the-job experience and component-conducted training. ~~PIR~~

~~has undertaken spot surveys of ex-students who have had an opportunity to apply their training in the field. These surveys have generally elicited the response that the training was of value in live situations and not infrequently suggestions are made for improvements in the courses that are accepted by~~

~~OTR.~~ Where the operating supervisor can establish minimum job performance standards, the trainer can guarantee the student will return better able to do his job. *without insert*

11. We hope we have not overlooked any valid disadvantages in those we have mentioned and believe they are more than offset by the following advantages of the proposed comprehensive training program:

a. The end product of the Phase II officer training program will give area divisions greater flexibility of reassignment of personnel to meet routine and crash programs. It will be the program's objective to better prepare these officers for eventual duties as senior case officers, small station or branch chiefs,

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and/or general operations officers or staff officers at Headquarters or in the field, including their administrative, planning, programming, budgeting, and logistical responsibilities. This involves:

(1) The ability of the student to perform these functions as appropriate to their grades immediately upon graduation in peace, war, or contingency situations.

(2) Their ability to improve and progress over the years after graduation to perform these functions at the highest grade levels.

(3) Their ability to adjust to likely future roles and working conditions of the Agency.

(4) Their ability upon graduation to satisfactorily perform in a wide variety of world-wide staff and operational assignments in accordance with manning requirements and programs established by the DD/P.

b. Programed training will facilitate career programming.

Officers and supervisors could begin to plan the timing of their own career development programs and those of their subordinates

with more assurance. *if desired programed training could be made a mandatory requirement for future assignment and promotion.*

c. The broadening of an officer's concept of the complexity of the missions of the Agency and his contribution to those

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missions while at the same time providing a refresher and additional assistance in increasing an officer's technical skills in his particular specialty.

d. Can enable one officer to compare his way of doing things with those of others and as such provide an important motivation for better performance *and as I set some of the disadvantages of compartmentation within CIA.*

e. Coming together on the mutual ground of a prolonged training program can help to eliminate any tendency toward jealousies, animosities, and competitive restrictions resulting in less Agency-wide cooperation which are inclined to grow up between organizations having overlapping spheres of responsibility.

f. Can simplify inter-agency communications by refreshing and refurbishing common concepts and common language with which to think and talk about our business.

g. Training tests and classroom performance in a uniform training program can provide one additional standard of common measurement as a means of appraisal, selection, and compensation of officers ~~on the basis of objective performance rather than personality judgments, which is better for both the individual and the Agency.~~

h. Comprehensive training could be accomplished in a shorter total period of time than is now possible under the current "piece-meal" system of assignment to individual training courses; i.e.,

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Table A shows what is believed to be essential training for the majority of the DD/P officers. As presently conducted, these courses would require in excess of 29 weeks. By programing the courses we can eliminate the repetition of background information now essential to the understanding of two or more courses and perhaps reduce the program to as little as 24 or 26 weeks, or include additional instruction in the 28 weeks program as desired by the DD/P.

i. ~~Peak training loads and slack periods which are now a problem may be minimized and instructor time and effort may be more uniformly spread between the JOT Program, existing advanced courses, and the proposed Phase II officer training program.~~

j. ~~Would programing answer the criticism, raised by some individuals, that CIA case officer training does not compare favorably, in length of time, with that of the Soviet I. S. case officer, who receives two or more years of training and indoctrination?~~

k. Are the right people being trained under the present piecemeal system? ~~Would~~ ^Pprogramed training ~~for as long as~~ ^{SAIC} ~~at least~~ result in a more conscientious selection of trainees in terms of future job utilization of the training received?

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12. As was done when we started the JOT Program, ^{suggested} It is proposed ^{we} to begin by scheduling our Phase II Officer Training Program once a year. If and when it becomes necessary to do so, it too can be presented on a biannual program. ~~JOT courses now start in January and July. Mid points between their starting times are April and October.~~ From the DD/P's viewpoint, October might be a good time to start our proposed Phase II DD/P Officer Training Program. October comes on the heels of the usual June to August DD/P rotational period. Allowing for home leave, October would appear to be a convenient starting time for many returnees. An October starting date would also result in a May or earlier graduation providing timely overseas replacement for the June to August returnees.

~~Chart I shows a possible timing interrelationship between our 1960/61 (30 week) JOT class's and the proposed Phase II (28 week) DD/P Officer Training Program, if it were decided to start such a program in the fall of 1960.~~ This scheduling can be adjusted as desired.

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13. This concludes our discussion. We believe the necessity for the programed mid-career training of the Clandestine Services

officer stems from the inherent nature and characteristics of clandestine operations. ~~Station with hundreds of state employees in foreign countries~~ ^{We will not always be able to maintain guest overt} The case officer of the future will have to have

initiative and comprehensive knowledge to the extreme degree.

Clandestine Services operations take place under conditions which cannot be predicted accurately; changes are rapid and sudden; today's

~~enemy is tomorrow's defector; today's agent is tomorrow's penetration~~

~~by the enemy.~~ ^{may not be} Higher echelon officers ~~are not~~ in a position to have a

precise picture of the entire situation, particularly over the entire

world. ~~It is not possible to deal successfully with all these complex~~

~~conditions by means of fixed regulations, untried plans, or hastily~~

~~improvised untrained task force personnel. If they are to be dealt~~

~~with successfully,~~ Case officers already located in the crucial area

who are capable of solving new problems by the quick application of

their own instant decisions and counter measures ^{will be} indispensable.

It is the Agency's obligation to equip its case officers with all the

skills that may be necessary to meet the ~~the~~ predictable demands that

will be made of them. (OTR's proposed Phase II ^{DBP} ~~the~~ officer training

program can help the Agency to meet this obligation.)

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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/PPS	W	3 May
2	[REDACTED]		
3			
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: This needs cutting and editing before presentation to DDP. Has it been coordinated internally in DTR? [REDACTED]			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
DTR			2 MAY 1963
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FORM NO. 237

Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	C/PPS	<i>[Signature]</i>	
2	D/DTR		
3	DTR		
4			
5			
6	[REDACTED]		
ACTION		REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<p>Remarks: <i>This is mid career program rewritten for sale to DDP. Copies have been given to [REDACTED]. If you approve I'd like to send info. copies to I & asst Director of Personnel.</i></p> <p><i>Recommend <u>not</u> send to the Dir & Purser. Concur in concept of this program to meet needs, <u>some</u> personnel, but not <u>all</u> of it.</i></p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[REDACTED]			<i>April 27</i>
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

25X1A

FROM:

NO.

DATE

PPS/OTR

17

3 May 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

REC'D

FWD'D

1.

C/SIC

23 May JWH

FYI:

2.

C/LAS

5/24 5/24 CBA

This is merely a rough draft of basic concept. Would appreciate your comments. Particularly:

3.

R/TR

25 May WCR

a. Do you buy the concept?

4.

PPS/OTR

M/W

b. Can this be done for mid-career program only with present manpower and facilities? If not, what is required?

5.

~~PPS/OTR~~

27/5 W

c. What is the earliest time it could be started?

6.

~~DDTR~~

Separate copy sent to C/Ops.

7.

~~DTR~~

2-4 comments sent directly to you.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

PPS/Nancy File

3-4:

a. Most enthusiastically!

b. Without radical re-scheduling of other courses, I am much concerned as to whether we do have the faculty for an add'l 22-week block at HQ. To implement proposal we would definitely have to reduce offerings even of some non-DDP courses.

c. Agree with Oct 60 if above can be linked

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FORM

DEC 55

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

25X1A

FROM:

NO.

PPS/OTR

17

DATE

3 May 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

a. C/IS

b. ATTN: *Faculty* Management Staff

4 May 60

WFB

9 May 11 May

CBF

FYI:

2.

C/JOTP

3.

PPS/OTR

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

This is a very rough draft of the basic concept. Would appreciate your comments. Particularly:

a. Do you buy the concept?

b. Can this be done for mid-career program only with present manpower and facilities? If not, what is required?

c. What is earliest time it could be started from your view point?

25X1A

1a to 1b: Please reply directly to Col. V. with copy to C/IS. WFB.

1b to All Hands: What happened to pages 2 & 3???

I think the idea is sound and merits fullest consideration. The big fly in the ointment is the point made in para 10, page 15 - availability of students. Realistically they should be available - actually I wonder whether they will be made available.

mmk 9/17
? numbers

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DEC 55

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